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A Good Measure of Sacrifice*: Aspects of Zambia’s
Contribution to the Liberation Wars in Southern Africa,
1964-1975
Clarence Chongo
University of Zambia
From the early 1960s, and throughout the 1970s, southern African liberation
movements successfully waged wars of national liberation, forcing white minority
regimes to negotiate independence under black majority rule. This success partly
stemmed from extensive diplomatic, military, and material support extended to
various liberation movements by regional alliances such as the frontline states and
transnational state actors and solidarity movements. This article examines salient
aspects of Zambia’s contribution as a prominent regional actor to the liberation
wars in southern Africa. In doing so, it underlines the nature and significance of
Zambia’s support for the liberation movements. I argue that Zambia’s authorities
employed a dual strategy, war and diplomacy, in seeking to secure black majority
rule in the region, but for mainly economic reasons, they were more inclined to
pursue diplomatic approaches rather than exclusively relying on violence. They
backed armed struggle only to the extent that it was a necessary instrument
to coerce the white minority regimes to the negotiating table, but this strategy
had limited success, and created numerous tensions and contradictions. Some
nationalist leaders accused Zambia’s authorities of undermining the liberation
wars. Based extensively on new Zambian archival documents and interviews with
former Zambian leaders, this article brings fresh evidence about the intricacies of
Zambia’s contribution to the liberation wars in southern Africa.
Key words:
Armed struggle, liberation war, southern Africa, liberation movements, Lusaka
Manifesto, Zambia’s government

Introduction
There is an extensive array of literature on liberation wars in southern Africa.
This scholarship invariably emphasises the importance of diplomatic, military,
and financial aid extended to liberation movements by international state

**

I borrowed this part of the title from P. Mgadla (2008) who did a similar study on
Botswana entitled ‘A Good Measure of Sacrifice: Botswana and the Liberation of
Southern Africa, 1965-1985’ Social Dynamics 34, no.1: 5-16.

1

A Good Measure of Sacrifice
and non-state actors. There is consensus among scholars about the role and
significance of Scandinavian countries in southern African liberation struggles
(Saunders, 2009). Sellstrom (2002 and 1999), who examines the role of Sweden
in the liberation wars, argues that the formation of broad and active political
opinion prior to 1969 was vital for parliament’s decision to endorse a policy of
direct official humanitarian assistance to liberation movements. While Eriksen
(2000) documents the role of Norwegian authorities and solidarity movements
such as churches and trade unions in the liberation struggles, Morgensteine
(2003) and Peltola (2009) examine the contribution of Denmark to the struggle
for black majority rule in the region.
Although this scholarship focuses on the contribution of international state
and non-state actors to the liberation wars, there is an appreciable collection
of studies that recently emerged underlining the significance of regional actors
in the liberation wars. The most prominent is Hashim Mbita’s project on
Southern African Liberation Struggles, 1960-1994 sponsored by the Southern
African Development Community (SADC). It not only traces the history of
liberation struggles as they unfolded in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South
Africa, and Zimbabwe, but in a series of volumes also analyses the regional
and international dimensions of southern African liberation wars (Temu and
Tembe, 2014). Similarly, the volumes of the South African Democracy Education
Trust (SADET) project on The Road to Democracy in South Africa examine the
history of South Africa’s liberation struggle and its regional and international
aspects (SADET, 2014). Other studies focus on the roles of Botswana and
Tanzania in the liberation of southern Africa (Morapedi, 2012; Oitsile, 2010;
Mgadla, 2008; Osei-Hwedie 1998; and Ishemo 2000). There is certainly a
wide collection of historical studies on liberation struggles from regional
and international standpoints, but there is conspicuously little that has been
written from the Zambian perspective, despite it being a prominent regional
actor. Except for Chris Chirwa’s work (2013) which discusses Zambia’s role in
South Africa’s liberation struggle, the few available published works examine
the role of Zambia in liberation wars only in the context of the frontline states
regional alliance (Temu and Tembe, 2014, Thompson, 1985). Yet, Zambia’s
contribution to liberation struggles in southern Africa did not begin with the
establishment of the frontline states alliance in 1974. It began much earlier,
dating to pre-independence days when prominent nationalists in the region
regularly collaborated during the anti-colonial struggles in their respective
territories (Rotberg, 1966; Hall, 1965; Gann, 1964; and Mulford, 1967). Thus,
a deeper appreciation of Zambia’s role can only be yielded when the story is
told from 1964. Currently there is growing emphasis to shift focus away from
approaches that previously underlined the importance of national governments
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in liberation struggles and towards examining exile histories of liberation
movements (Sapire, 2009; Macmillan, 2013; Williams, 2015; Alexander,
McGregor, and Miles-Tendi, 2017). However, given an array of rich Zambian
archival evidence that has emerged, it has become more imperative to revisit
and interrogate salient aspects of Zambia’s contribution to the liberation wars,
and cast new light on issues previous scholars glossed over and sometimes
took for granted. This article seeks to interrogate the nature and significance of
Zambia’s contribution to liberation wars in southern Africa.

Origins of Armed Struggles: A Synopsis
The origins of armed struggles in southern Africa varied in time and space, but
the pattern and processes which spurred armed resistance movements were
similar. During the colonial period, Africans were systematically exploited
and denied fundamental human rights. They served as tools of exploitation,
furthering the economic interests of the ruling elite within the colonial
system (Rodney, 1990).The colonial political system also excluded them from
participating peacefully in the political processes. Africans were often denied
opportunity to promote their political interests and seek changes in the political
system by constitutional means (Afigbo, 1990).What hardened the attitudes of
Africans was the fact that, whilst their counterparts elsewhere in Africa were
being decolonised by metropolitan powers, white minority governments in
southern Africa sought to reverse this process by tightening their grip on
political power.1 In May 1948, an Afrikaner nationalist regime led by Dr. D. F.
Malan was elected into office in South Africa and shortly afterwards began to
introduce apartheid, a system which promoted separate development and social
exclusion of races (Nolutshungu, 1975, 98).White supremacy was given further
impetus by white minority settlers in Rhodesia when they unilaterally declared
independence from Britain in November 1965, effectively rolling back any
progress towards black majority rule. Elsewhere, the Portuguese authoritarian
administration, led initially by Antonio Salazar and succeeded by Marcello
Caetano, tightened the grip over its African empire. In 1951, it incorporated
Angola and Mozambique into Portugal as overseas provinces (Oliver and
Atmore, 1981, 269). The intransigence of white minority regimes, coupled with
many years of social inequalities, ruthless economic exploitation, and intense
political repression, fuelled resentment among Africans. Consequently, Africans
in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South
West Africa (now Namibia) organised armed resistance movements in order to
overthrow white minority regimes.
Thus, by the mid-1960s, southern Africa was on fire. The brutal and
repressive nature of white minority regimes compelled nationalist movements
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to seek asylum in countries with independent black governments for purposes
of further organising armed struggle. Apart from Tanzania, Zaire, Botswana,
Lesotho, and Swaziland in the region, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),
member countries further afield, including among others Ghana under Kwame
Nkrumah, and Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, liberation movements also found
strong support in Zambia, where authorities allowed them to establish bases.
They included the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU) of Zimbabwe, African National Congress (ANC)
and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) of South Africa, South West African People’s
Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, and Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique
(FRELIMO) of Moazambique and Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola
(MPLA) of Angola. However, Zambian authorities had to deal with domestic
concerns prior to accepting to host liberation movements.

Domestic Debates and Quest to Support Armed Struggles
Zambia’s quest to back liberation wars was a highly contentious issue in domestic
political discourse. The decision was contested less by Cabinet Ministers
within the governing United National Independence Party (UNIP) and more by
opposition and independent Members of Parliament (MPs). Sikota Wina insisted
that during discussions on foreign policy matters, including the question of
supporting liberation struggles in southern Africa, Cabinet Ministers were
apprehensive about pursuing such a policy. They often expressed concern about
the possible risks that supporting armed conflicts in neighbouring countries
might entail for the country’s economy.2 These concerns were based on the fact
that Zambia’s economic survival depended, to a large extent, on supply routes
controlled by white minority regimes it was trying to overthrow.
Such anxiety emanated from the dilemma Zambian authorities confronted
in the wake of the Rhodesian crisis and the mounting pressure to support armed
struggles. Although the Zambian government, in line with OAU decisions, was
willing to support armed struggles in Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique, its
economy was heavily dependent on supply routes controlled by neighbouring
white minority regimes. If the Zambian government remained neutral, or at best
decided for economic reasons to cooperate rather than oppose white minority
regimes by refusing to assist liberation movements, it was bound to lose face
among African countries. The magnitude of this dilemma was highlighted during
Cabinet meetings in August 1965. One Cabinet Minister said:
Withdrawing our support from…freedom fighters would be in conflict
with…avowed aims of…OAU and other…states in Africa, apart from
being in violation of our fundamental principles upon which Zambia
was founded. Such action would…make Zambia one of the most sinister
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nations that…ever polluted the pages of the history of…independent
movement in Africa. Zambia has the moral duty to help in the historic
movement of wiping out colonialism in favour of the democratizing
process.3
While Zambia did not want to lose face and appear a weak link in the OAU’s
confrontation with white minority regimes, it was deeply concerned about the
potential damage to the economy of pursuing a confrontational course. At stake
was the country’s economic survival. Here was a case in which the government
sought to strike a balance between its economic interests and pursuing a
revolutionary course. Thus, as another Cabinet Minister argued:
…the question of keeping the Congo/Angola route open depends…in
part on whether or not we provoke the Portuguese in Mozambique. It
is necessary for us…to be more cautious in our pronouncements on
Rhodesian issues in order not to encourage action of aggression from
that country which would lead to the closure of the southern route in
the event of UDI, for it is my firm belief that an adverse reaction by
Mozambique would [inevitably] have further adverse repercussions on
the Angola section of the western route. It is noted that we have a moral
duty to help…Rhodesian nationalists, but this should take into account the
difficulties of keeping the machinery of our economy running smoothly
in the interests of this nation. In this respect I suggest that as little as
possible is said about Rhodesia unless we are forced to make a reply.4
Despite apprehension expressed by Cabinet Ministers, it can be argued that
there was more consensus than disagreement on policy in the UNIP government
regarding the decision to support liberation struggles. In fact, from government
and party documents examined by this author, there is no evidence to suggest
there was open, intense disagreement within Cabinet or UNIP Central Committee
on foreign policy, especially on the question of supporting liberation wars.
If Cabinet Ministers were apprehensive, opposition and independent MPs
were more vocal in contesting government policy of supporting liberation
movements. Their concerns were often expressed during parliamentary debates
on foreign policy. As early as 1965, Harry Nkumbula, president of opposition
African National Congress (ANC) and parliamentarian for Monze, described
government’s decision to back liberation wars as a “very unwise policy” which
amounted to quarrelling with neighbours.5 Another opposition ANC MP, Edward
Liso, questioned government policy of allowing liberation movements to open
offices in Zambia because it amounted to “provocation” where the safety of
citizens would not be guaranteed if neighbouring white minority regimes carried
out “retaliatory measures” against Zambia.6 In mid-1966 the Independent MP
for Ndola, Cecil Burney expressed concern that government was “taking an
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open risk” by supporting liberation movements (De Roche, 2009, 77-97). Again
Nkumbula feared the prospect of Zambians paying a high price for government’s
decision to support liberation struggles.7 In 1967, Burney wondered whether
government’s willingness to back liberation movements was in the best interest
of the country and urged it to “defuse this situation so we could get back to a
more normal form of life.” Hugh Mitchley, an Independent MP representing the
Midlands advised government that “what is needed is a policy for all countries
to stop arguing with their neighbours and get on with their development.”8 In
1968, ANC MP for Mbabala, Edward Nyanga, urged government to negotiate
with the white minority regimes in a peaceful manner instead of threatening
war. Similarly, Richard Farmer, Independent MP for Copperbelt Central advised
government to reassess its foreign policy on southern Africa and see whether
“the policy cannot be modified into a more conciliatory one.”9
The MPs criticism of government’s policy on southern Africa reflected
the general concern of ordinary Zambians about the potential damage to the
country’s economic stability as a consequence of supporting liberation struggles.
Despite these concerns, Zambia implemented OAU’s policy and backed armed
struggles in southern Africa.

Nature of Support for Liberation Movements
Zambian support for liberation movements included offering them recognition,
transit and broadcasting facilities, and financial and material aid. The government
also accorded diplomatic backing to leaders of liberation movements. These
forms of support must be understood within the framework of the Liberation
Committee which Zambia joined shortly after independence becoming an active
member.10African leaders established the Liberation Committee in 1963 with a
mission to accelerate the liberation of African countries from white minority
rule. Based in Dar-es-Salaam, capital of Tanganyika (from 1964 Tanzania), the
Liberation Committee was mandated to i) coordinate material and financial
support sent to liberation movements from independent African states and from
abroad; ii) give recognition and financial assistance to selected revolutionary
movements; iii) reconcile differences among rival insurgent groups so that they
may present a united front; iv) facilitate formation of revolutionary alliances
across national boundaries; v) publicise the struggle through diplomacy in
international circles (El-Khawas, 1977, 25-41).
Providing recognition to liberation movements was a vital aspect of Zambia’s
contribution to the liberation wars, but such recognition was informed by the
Liberation Committee.11 Zambia’s leaders often accepted liberation movements
which had been previously recognised by the Liberation Committee. That they
supported nationalist movements that had received formal and prior acceptance
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by the Liberation Committee remained a rule rather than a norm. In practice,
Zambian authorities sometimes backed nationalist organisations that had never
been recognised by the Liberation Committee.12 The degree of militancy and
level of effectiveness on the battlefield were two important yardsticks which
governed the Liberation Committee’s decision whether or not to recognise a
particular liberation movement. Recognition was an essential qualification for
eligibility to receive other forms of assistance from the Liberation Committee.13
The initial form of support Zambia rendered to liberation movements was
to host them in Lusaka.14 Towards the end of 1965 government acquired a new
office building at Charter Welfare Hall, in Kamwala, Lusaka and placed it at the
disposal of liberation movements for use as their headquarters. This followed
previous unsuccessful attempts to purchase an office block on Bradford Street in
Lusaka from Irving and Johnson for approximately £7,000. The government did
not purchase this property because it was not suitable for the accommodation
of all the liberation movements.16 The Zambian authorities designated the new
office building as the African Liberation Centre (ALC) and appointed Mukuka
Nkoloso as director. As a personal representative of President Kaunda at the
Liberation Centre, Nkoloso was responsible for coordinating the activities of
the liberation movements, ensuring that they were provided with office space
to conduct day-to-day operations, as well as organising publicity campaigns,
and facilitating distribution of aid to the organisations. He reported directly to
Kaunda. Nkoloso worked closely with the executive secretary of the Liberation
Committee based in Tanzania by screening the cadres to ensure those who went
for military training and came back to join the struggle at the battlefront were
genuine freedom fighters.18
Since liberation movements were a potential threat to Zambia’s internal
security, the Zambian authorities strictly controlled their operations in the
country by formulating rules and regulations to govern and regulate their
activities.19 Due to the security implications, matters involving the operations
of liberation movements were handled and coordinated at the highest level. The
principal office responsible was the Ministry of Presidential Affairs. It worked
closely with the Office of the President (OP), and the ministries of Defence,
Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Local Government, as well as the director of
the Liberation Centre.
The provision of transit facilities for transportation of cadres, and shipment
of war materials, was another vital form of support Zambian authorities accorded
to liberation movements.20 Throughout the period under review, the cadres were
granted the right of passage to undergo military training in East Africa and beyond
in socialist countries such as China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. In the
sub-region, major military training camps were located in Tanzania. The earliest
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training camp was established in 1961 at Kongwa, situated in the central part of
the country. Here, almost all the liberation movements sent cadres for military
training. However, as the liberation struggle gained momentum and the number
of freedom fighters seeking training increased, it became necessary to open more
camps. Consequently, Wami, Nachingwea, Itumbi and Mgagao were set up. The
latter two hosted ANC and PAC militants as well as freedom fighters from Angola,
Zimbabwe and Namibia. Nachingwea was reserved for the FRELIMO fighters
because of its proximity to Mozambique, while Tundura and Bagamoyo were
established as education training centres; Mtwara was a rearguard hospital.21 The
ANC also secured a training camp at Kingolwira and a residential site at Msanvu,
while PAC trained its cadres at Masuguru but later moved to Msungura. Both
camps were in the coastal region. In the 1970s, Masuguru became a settlement
camp for PAC cadres who migrated in larger numbers into the country in that
period. In 1976, more South African refugees flocked to Tanzania following the
Soweto uprising in South Africa, so the ANC requested additional settlement and
training camps from the government of Tanzania. Through the coordination of
the Liberation Committee, the ANC was granted an 100 acre stretch of land at
Mazimbu in Morogoro which was later extended to 250 acres. On this site in 1978,
the ANC built its first educational institution, to teach the young cadres who had
fled South Africa in the aftermath of the Soweto killings.22 Conducted by Chinese
military instructors recruited by the Liberation Committee, military training
for the cadres lasted between four and six months. The recruits were trained
in elementary knowledge of regular army tactics, modern guerilla warfare, and
combat operations. Other forms of training included physical fitness, use of small
arms, rocket launchers, light mortars, and plastic explosives. They were also
taught field engineering, sabotage, ambushes and patrols, defence and attack up
to platoon level, principles of guerilla formations, situation of guerilla actions, and
general tactics .23 After completing training, cadres were granted safe passage and
deployed for military action at the battlefront. Both Zambia and Tanzania worked
closely with the Liberation Committee in transiting and training cadres. They
established rules and procedures to govern transportation of cadres through
Zambia to Tanzania and back. For example in 1967, G. S Magombe, the executive
secretary of the Liberation Committee addressed a letter to Vernon Mwaanga, the
permanent secretary in the Office of the President. He noted that:
I have informed all leaders of liberation movements that with immediate
effect all their requests for allowing their cadres to come to Tanzania for
military training should be routed to the Minister for Presidential Affairs
[in Zambia] who will give them a “Recruitment Form” to sign and that it
is only after completing this form that their trainees would be allowed to
come to Tanzania.24
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By signing the recruitment forms, the cadres agreed to undergo voluntary
military training and pledged, upon completion of training, to return to their
home country and paericipate in the struggle against the colonialists. In the
initial stages, trained cadres earmarked for deployment to the battlefront were
allowed to transit Zambia only in small units of six people per group. Until
such a group was infiltrated into the enemy territory, no other group of trained
cadres was allowed to cross.25 These procedures were important because they
served various purposes. Firstly, they allowed both Zambia and Tanzania to
maintain strict control over transportation of the militants in and between the
two countries. Secondly, they helped cadres uphold a sense of discipline and
dedication to the struggle. Thirdly, it was vital to maintain secrecy, speed, and
security while transiting the guerrillas.
Another key feature of Zambia’s contribution to the liberation wars was
that it allowed safe transmission and storage of military materials, including
arms, ammunition, and other logistics for the liberation movements in the
region. Military weapons mainly came from two sources, namely, the stockpile
purchased by the Liberation Committee, and donations by countries from within
Africa and abroad.26 Shipment of military weapons was a highly sensitive issue
because of the security nature of the exercise. For instance, as early as September
1965, Zambia Police at Kapiri Mposhi in Central Province impounded a vehicle
carrying a large quantity of arms destined for the FRELIMO depot in Lusaka
(Morris, 1974, 249). The reason for impounding the vehicle was that it was
transporting arms without police escort, raising fears about the possibility of
weapons finding their way into the hands of unauthorised persons, consequently
posing a serious security threat to local communities. However, once police
established the source and destination of the arms, and security guarantees for
their transportation, they released the vehicle.
During the early years of the struggle, liberation movements lacked
adequate arms. Out of desperation, they sometimes used unorthodox methods
to obtain and transport weapons. In April 1966, Zambia Police again impounded
a vehicle carrying a large number of weapons from Tanzania and destined for
a dispersal base in Zambia. One of its occupants was sentenced to one year
imprisonment for illegally possessing 200 grenades, 200 detonators, rifles and
a revolver (Morris 1974, 249). Evidence suggests that, as liberation wars in the
region raged, the presence of freedom fighters in the country increased and the
cases of unauthorised movements of weapons became more frequent, posing
a serious security threat to local communities. For instance in July 1966, the
Zambian government was forced to revoke recognition of Noel Gabriel Mukono
as a ZANU representative after, for reasons unknown, he shot a local Zambian
man with a pistol in Chieftainess Waitwika’s area in Isoka District.27 Zambia’s
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decision to establish weapons’ dumps in specific areas of the country’s Eastern,
Northwestern, Southern and Western provinces was partly a response to, and
an expression of concern with, unauthorised proliferation of weapons in the
country. It was also partly a decision taken in response to recommendations
adopted by the OAU in July 1969 regarding the establishment of depots and
storage of war materials in member countries.28
It is important to emphasise the significance of providing transit facilities
to liberation movements. The border between Zambia and Rhodesia became
highly militarised after white settlers declared UDI. It was policed on a regular
basis by both Zambian and Rhodesian security forces. Consequently, many
ZAPU, ZANU, ANC and PAC militants could only be recruited and transported
for military training in East Africa and abroad through Zambia via an
independent country, Botswana. However, the militants frequently experienced
difficulties transiting through Botswana mainly because, during the early days
of independence, the authorities refused to grant them transit rights for fear
of provoking white minority regimes in neighbouring countries (Mutambara,
2014, 99, and Morapedi, 2012, 73-90). Similarly, and perhaps for economic
reasons, the governments of Malawi and Lesotho were reluctant to allow
freedom fighters to transit through their territories. They refused to implement
the OAU’s long-standing policy calling on member states to assist African
liberation movements. Rather, the two countries chose to collaborate with the
white minority regimes. The Congo Kinshasa government also for some time
prevented MPLA from using its territory to transmit weapons and cadres to the
battlefront essentially because it supported a rival nationalist movement, the
Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA).29 Given the above scenario,
the nationalists mainly depended on Zambia for transmitting weapons and
cadres and later, establishing guerrilla training camps. The deliberate policy
of providing unrestricted transit facilities to the military cadres by Zambian
authorities significantly helped liberation movements to successfully prosecute
the liberation wars.
Support for liberation movements was not confined to providing transit
rights and operational bases. It extended to provision of broadcasting facilities.
As in other matters concerning liberation movements, Zambia sought to provide
these facilities as a response to the OAU’s appeal that:
independent African countries in whose territories freedom fighters
operate…should place at the disposal of such movements facilities for
informing and stirring nationalist opinion…and make available an
allocated time per week for the dissemination of propaganda on their
radio and information media into occupied territories.30
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Zambia realised that armed struggle could not be prosecuted only on
the battle field but that it also needed an effective propaganda machinery, a
crucial tool for conducting psychological warfare. Zambia allowed use of its
broadcasting facilities by the liberation movements. In May 1966, the Zambian
Cabinet endorsed UNIP Central Committee’s decision to allow ZAPU to make
broadcasts on Zambia Broadcasting Services (ZBS), subject to vetting by the
Minister of Information and Postal Services.31 By December 1966, Zambian
authorities approved ZANU’s request to use broadcasting facilities on Radio
Zambia on condition that broadcasts would be scrutinised by the Minister of
Home Affairs.32 In January 1971, MPLA was allowed to begin a daily 45-minute
programme on ZBS called “Angola Combatente.” It quickly acquired a wide
audience. By May 1973, Zambia formally inaugurated its new external services,
“The War of Words Channel”, with the aid of powerful Chinese transmitters.
FRELIMO, ZAPU, ZANU, MPLA, ANC and SWAPO were each allocated one hour
a day. Consequently, as Anglin and Shaw (1979, 243) noted, Radio Zambia
blanketed the sub-continent for more than forty hours a week in twenty-two
languages with the liberation movements accepting responsibility for all the
content. This constituted assistance on a massive scale and undoubtedly had a
significant impact on African opinion throughout southern Africa.
Zambian authorities also supported the liberation wars in the region by
providing material and financial aid to the liberation movements through the
OAU. On a bilateral basis, they accorded freedom fighters medical facilities, food,
and accommodation. For instance in 1969, the MPLA expressed gratitude to
Zambia “for the important role which they did not cease to play in the struggle
to liberate Angola”, adding that “at present MPLA sends to the Zambian hospitals
sick and wounded persons who do not find medical care inside Angola.”33
Similarly, SWAPO emphasised that wounded militants on the battlefront were
often brought to Zambia for medical treatment.34 Providing financial and
other forms of material aid was crucial for the day-to-day operations of the
liberation movements and maintenance of cadres in Zambia. Bilateral aid was
usually drawn from Zambia’s own resources. Given the limited resources at
the disposal of the Zambian government at a time when it was consolidating
its own independence, drawing upon its coffers to finance activities of the
liberation movements placed an extra burden on state resources. For this
reason, in 1968, the government was compelled to seek financial relief from
the Liberation Committee to meet ever increasing emergency needs of the
liberation movements based in Lusaka.35 The request was approved. It was, in
fact, in this context that in March 1969, the Liberation Committee decided to
open a sub-office in Lusaka. The sub-office was required to manage contingency
funds to meet emergency needs such as the supply of medicines for freedom
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fighters, transportation of food and arms to the war front, infiltration of
freedom fighters, and management of vehicles at the war front. Apart from
making payments of fixed amounts to liberation movements based in Lusaka,
the sub-office also supervised all forms of assistance and weapons given by the
Liberation Committee to different liberation movements. It also supervised the
infiltration and training of cadres in Lusaka.36 This office drew its administrative
funds from the Liberation Committee Special Fund and worked closely with the
African Liberation Centre. Liberation movements also benefitted from Zambia’s
bilateral financial aid in the form of tax relief. As early as mid-1965, the Zambian
Cabinet approved a recommendation from the Ministry of Finance to waive
import duty on all items imported by liberation movements, including motor
vehicles and office equipment. The principal object was to grant financial relief
to liberation movements and enhance their effective operations.37
Zambian authorities also assisted liberation movements indirectly by
directing financial aid through the Liberation Committee’s Special Fund. The
Liberation Committee derived its revenue for financing liberation movements
from three principal sources, namely, contributions by OAU member countries
in accordance with the established scale of assessment, subventions from
OAU headquarters on a quarterly basis, and donations by institutions and
organisations in Africa and abroad.38 For its operations and budgetary
allocations to liberation movements, the Liberation Committee relied almost
exclusively on the goodwill contributions made on a regular basis by OAU
member states. That the Liberation Committee often experienced financial
difficulties, partly as a result of lack of financial contributions, and partly because
of possible mismanagement of resources, constitutes an important theme
that characterised the period of its existence (Mononi, 1975). The Liberation
Committee frequently lacked adequate financial resources partly because of
lack of contributions by member countries, but throughout the period under
review, Zambia consistently met its financial obligations to the Special Fund.
Its financial commitment to the Liberation Committee was clearly visible.
Although Zambian authorities pledged in 1966 to continually honour their
financial obligations to the Liberation Committee and since then consistently
did so, by 1970, they became increasingly disillusioned and frustrated by
the failure of OAU members to meet their financial obligations to the Special
Fund. In particular, Kaunda accused independent African countries of letting
down Zambia by “failing to give financial support to the liberation struggles
in southern Africa”. He complained bitterly: “you see our economy is in tatters
because of the liberation struggles. We are still able to pay the little that we
are asked to the Liberation Committee” (Times of Zambia, 1970). He charged
that “those countries which failed to honour their financial obligations to the
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Liberation Committee were being unfair because the struggle in southern Africa
was for the dignity and emancipation of Africa as a whole” (Times of Zambia,
1979). If consistency and regularity of payments to the Liberation Committee
formed part of the criteria of assessing a country’s commitment to the liberation
wars in southern Africa, then Zambia fully met the criteria.

Zambian Diplomacy
At global level, Zambia’s leaders used diplomacy to help legitimise liberation
movements, routinely urging world leaders to accord nationalists a hearing and
extend recognition to nationalist movements. At international fora such as the
OAU, United Nations (UN), Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and
Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation (AASO), Zambia’s representatives implored
other leaders to support policies aimed at promoting black majority rule in
southern Africa. Despite strong opposition from Western powers, Zambia’s
diplomats at the UN often took a leading role in sponsoring resolutions calling on
the international community to take effective measures against white minority
regimes which denied Africans the right to self-determination. They backed
economic sanctions designed to isolate white minority regimes, and consistently
applied diplomatic pressure on western governments to exercise influence
over white minority regimes to accept the principle of black majority rule. The
significance of Zambia’s diplomacy at international level was evident. It helped
to legitimate armed struggle in southern Africa thus attracting transnational
assistance for liberation movements. It also served to publicise and clarify the
problem of white minority rule as one requiring global attention.39

The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa
For Zambia’s leaders, one of the key diplomatic successes in galvanising
international solidarity for liberation wars in southern Africa was the hosting
of the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States (CECAS) in
April 1969, which was attended by fourteen African leaders. The significance of
the conference was the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto on southern Africa.40
The key aspect of the manifesto was that it gave priority to negotiations first, as
opposed to violence, as the basis for achieving change. This strategy became the
basis of Zambia’s diplomatic efforts in promoting the struggle for black majority
rule in southern Africa. The Manifesto was a collective statement of fourteen
African leaders, but Anglin (1975, 471-503) claimed the principle authors were
Kaunda and Nyerere, reflecting the strategic role of the two leaders in regional
affairs. The Manifesto was subsequently adopted by the OAU and endorsed both
by the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement in 1970.
Although the manifesto was designed to express solidarity with liberation
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movements, on the diplomatic front, Zambian-based nationalist leaders
expressed concern with the tone of the manifesto, and questioned some of
its provisions. The nationalists were concerned with the perceived lack of
pugnaciousness expressed in the manifesto by African leaders. For instance, in
paragraph 3 , African leaders stressed the importance of, and recognised the
inevitability of, “transitional arrangements” in transforming southern Africa
from white minority rule to black majority rule.41 However, the nationalist
leaders rejected the notion of transferring power from the whites to the
blacks under transitional arrangements. Rather, they underlined the need
for immediate, effective transfer of power.42 A major concern was that it was
drawn up by African leaders without consulting the nationalist movements. The
nationalist leaders opposed the principle of negotiations accepted by African
leaders, insisting it weakened the case for freedom fighters.43Although Zambia’s
authorities ferociously defended their position by insisting that “Heads of
State were under no obligation to consult liberation movements” and that the
“manifesto took into account the aspirations of freedom fighters for whose
benefit it was declared”,44 the nationalists refused to accept it because of its
explicit emphasis on negotiations. They would later call for its withdrawal by
“those who adopted it”,45
Although the manifesto was condemned by nationalist leaders, its
significance from the diplomatic perspective can not be underestimated. It
enhanced Zambia’s standing in Africa as a strategic player in the struggle against
white minority rule in southern Africa (Mwanakatwe 1994, 64, and Anglin
1975, 471-503). This culminated in the election of Kaunda as the OAU Chairman
in Addis Ababa in September 1970, where he was mandated by African Heads
of State to lead an OAU delegation to countries supplying arms to South Africa
to dissuade them from doing so.46 Prior to undertaking his European mission,
Kaunda successfully hosted the Non-Aligned Summit in Lusaka which extended
his mission to include members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO). The Non-Aligned Summit was attended by more than fifty countries
including representatives of liberation movements from around the globe.47
Addressing the conference, Kaunda stressed that “imperialism, colonialism,
and racial oppression” persisted in southern Africa mainly because western
countries continued to provide overt political, economic, and military support
to white minority regimes. He warned western countries of the inevitability
of violence if they delayed in “discharging justice” and “stood in the way of
peaceful change towards majority rule”.48 The conference produced several
resolutions which dealt with the pertinent issue of white minority rule in
southern Africa.49 Three important themes were dominant in all the resolutions
on southern Africa. Firstly, the Non-Aligned leaders condemned white minority
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regimes for perpetrating racist and oppressive policies, but they also called for
strengthening of economic sanctions against them. Secondly, they expressed
solidarity with oppressed Africans in dependent territories. And, thirdly, they
pledged renewed commitment to providing material and moral support to
liberation movements.50 That Zambia successfully hosted the Non-Aligned
Conference, attended by a huge number of world leaders, represented a key
diplomatic achievement.
Meanwhile, Kaunda visited a number of Western countries in 1970, to
dissuade NATO countries from supplying arms to South Africa, and to formally
present to the United Nations resolutions and declarations of the OAU and
Non-Aligned Summit.51 During his visits to Italy and West Germany, Kaunda
urged the two countries to stop supporting firms participating in the Cabora
Bassa hydroelectric scheme because the project was designed to “consolidate
Portuguese colonialism” in Africa.52 In Britain, he advised the British prime
minister, Edward Heath, to halt his government’s intention to sell arms to South
Africa because it would give the apartheid regime “a badge of respectability”
(Times of Zambia, 1970). The theme of arms sales to South Africa dominated
Kaunda’s speech at the UN General Assembly in October 1970. He pointed out
that to supply arms to South Africa “is to cast a vote for apartheid” because the
sales would support “South African expansionism and dominance” and give her
“authority to establish her military presence in the rest of southern Africa”.53 He
challenged the Portuguese government to dismantle its African empire, insisting
Zambia and the OAU were “prepared to assist” it “in any efforts to prepare the
people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau for self-determination and
independence”. Kaunda warned the Portuguese that if they continued with
their “inflexible policy”, Zambia and the OAU would be prepared to “continue
supporting the freedom fighters in their struggle for freedom, peace and justice”
and that Portugal was “bound to lose the war”.54
Kaunda’s mission to NATO countries met with limited success. He failed
to dissuade Britain from supplying arms to South Africa and equally failed
to secure a meeting with Richard Nixon, the US President. Upon returning to
Lusaka, Kaunda, in apparent reference to Edward Heath, called on Zambians
not to hate the British people “for the stupidity of one man even if he is their
leader” (Times of Zambia, 1970). Notwithstanding his international diplomatic
efforts aimed at highlighting the problem of white minority rule in southern
Africa, Kaunda felt frustrated by western countries for according low priority to
resolving the problem of white minority rule in the region. That he succeeded in
clearly articulating the position of the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement on
white minority rule in southern Africa constitutes the most significant outcome
of his European mission.
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Zambia’s diplomatic efforts to exert pressure on western governments to
act in favour of justice for the vast majority of blacks in white minority controlled
territories in southern Africa did not end with the mission to NATO countries. It
was extended to other international fora, including the Commonwealth. At the
Commonwealth Conference in Singapore in 1971, during which the question
of arms sales again featured prominently and threatened the very existence of
the organisation, Kaunda’s diplomatic skills prevailed. Under his influence and
leadership, the Heads of State and Government approved the Declaration of
Commonwealth Principles. The large part of the declaration was based on the
draft introduced and presented by Kaunda. Part of the text of the declaration
criticised white minority governments for promoting racial discrimination
and oppression, and called upon all Commonwealth members to support the
principles of self-determination in southern Africa.55 The Commonwealth
Conference in Singapore provided a vital platform for Commonwealth leaders to
denounce racial discrimination globally, but it also offered another opportunity
for African leaders, led by Kaunda, to exert pressure on Britain to resolve white
minority rule in Rhodesia and exercise influence on South Africa to dismantle
apartheid.

Dialogue with South Africa and African Unity
Throughout the 1970s, Kaunda emerged as the leading critic of white minority
regimes and particularly South Africa’s apartheid system. He was well placed to
spearhead the OAU’s campaign to dissuade governments in Africa and elsewhere
from collaborating with South Africa (Nolutshungu, 1975, 231). However, while
addressing parliament in April 1971, South Africa’s prime minister, John Vorster
seized the opportunity to “expose” Kaunda as a “double talker”. He explained that
it was in the interest of southern Africa that people should realise that Kaunda
had been talking to South Africa since 1968 while urging other countries not
to hold a dialogue with her. Kaunda had condemned trade with South Africa,
while Zambia, itself, traded with South Africa.56 Zambia’s authorities responded
by publishing details of the correspondence that took place between the two
leaders.57 The exchange of letters suggests it was, in fact, Vorster who had been
making overtures for a meeting to Kaunda through secret envoys but failed
due to “irreconcilable political philosophies” between the two leaders on the
“central question of the dignity and equality of man”. Wina dismissed Vorster’s
accusations as “an utter fabrication at a very high level” (Times of Zambia,
1971).
Vorster’s systematic attempts to discredit Kaunda, and the subsequent
disclosure of his secret diplomacy with the Zambian leader, must be seen
in context. During this period, South Africa was implementing what Sam
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Nolutshungu (1975, 256) described as new “outward-looking policies”.The
concept of dialogue formed a vital element of these policies. South Africa sought,
by patient persuasion rather than defiance, to win over African and Asian
states to a new attitude towards South Africa. First proposed by Dr. Hendrik F.
Verwoerd, and later adopted by Vorster, the concept of ”dialogue first” came into
South Africa’s political vocabulary in 1969, when it began to be used by South
Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller (Legum, 1972, 66). Vorster
hoped to win over Kaunda, especially because Kaunda was not only the Chairman
of the OAU, but also a virulent critic of South Africa’s racist policies. Vorster’s
failure to change Kaunda’s attitude to South Africa’s policies perhaps produced
feelings of frustrations. Thus, his disclosures were calculated to embarrass and
discredit Kaunda and plant seeds of discord within the OAU. The timing of his
announcement was also critical. It coincided with a press conference held by
Ivory Coast President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the new victim of the “outwardlooking policy”, at which he launched his campaign of dialogue with South
Africa.58 Houphouet-Boigny’s endorsement of dialogue with South Africa set the
stage for the struggle which almost divided the OAU between the pro-dialogue
club led by Ivory Coast and the rest of Africa. However, the Eighth OAU Summit
held in Addis Ababa in June 1971 overwhelmingly rejected dialogue with South
Africa.59 The victory against the pro-dialogue club was consolidated at the
Seventh Conference of the East and Central African States in Mogadishu in 1971.

From Lusaka Manifesto to Mogadishu Declaration
At the Conference of East and Central African States in Mogadishu in October
1971, African leaders reviewed the decolonisation process and issued the
“Mogadishu Declaration” which affirmed the necessity of intensifying armed
struggle as the only method of liberating southern Africa.60 Whereas the Lusaka
Manifesto was primarily a statement of principles, the Mogadishu Declaration
outlined the strategy of liberating southern Africa. The emphasis on armed
struggle impressed liberation movements. For instance, the ANC of South
Africa welcomed the declaration as “a revolutionary document” which would
serve both as a “call and a rallying point for all revolutionary African States and
liberation movements to close their ranks”.61 Similarly, the PAC described the
conference as “the best conference ever held in East Africa”, underlining that
“the shift from the Lusaka Manifesto to the Mogadishu Declaration” represented
“a qualitative change from the euphemism of the former to the revolutionary
rhetoric of the latter”.62 The revolutionary character of the Mogadishu Declaration
had a psychological impact on the liberation movements. The renewed promise
by African leaders to provide military and material aid encouraged liberation
movements to intensify armed struggle in southern Africa. The collapse of
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Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola in 1975 directly resulted
from the escalation of armed struggle waged by FRELIMO and MPLA respectively.
Zambia’s leaders participated in drawing up the Mogadishu Declaration,
but the document had limited impact on their own perception of the anticolonial struggle in southern Africa. At least up to 1974, Zambia’s authorities
continued to regard the principle of negotiations enunciated in the Lusaka
Manifesto as the basis for dismantling white minority rule in the region.63 In
this context, Zambia did not hesitate to seize every opportunity to mediate
between liberation movements and minority regimes, especially when they
demonstrated willingness to talk to each other. Zambia’s favourable response
to South Africa’s initiative to resolve peacefully white minority rule in Rhodesia
was a classic example (Anglin, 1975).
In September 1973, while FRELIMO intensified armed struggle in
Mozambique, Kaunda opened secret contacts with the Portuguese colonial
administration. The goal was to find a political solution rather than
continuation with the armed struggle.64 Thus, the collapse of the Portuguese
colonial administration, partly as a result of a coup d’état staged by General
Antonio Spinola in April 1974, was a welcome development to Zambia. Kaunda
facilitated talks between the new Portuguese government and liberation
movements in Mozambique and Angola which culminated in the installation
of transitional governments leading up to independence of the two countries
in June and November 1975, respectively.65 However, Kaunda’s inclination to
facilitate a rapid political settlement of the war in Portuguese colonies, and later
in Rhodesia, must be read in the correct context. At the time, Zambia’s economy
was undergoing enormous strain, aggravated partly by the Rhodesian border
closure in 1973, and partly by external forces, including the declining commodity
prices of copper and a rise in oil prices on the international market.66 A rapid
end to armed struggle would reduce the country’s economic problems as it was
dependent on trade routes via Rhodesia to Mozambican ports, and by Benguela
Railway in Angola, for its export and import trade with the outside world.
Angolan Crisis and Zambia’s Ambiguous Attitude
While Mozambique proceeded to independence, a new political reality, civil war,
emerged in Angola, posing a serious challenge to the OAU and exposing divisions
in the organisation. The contest for political power among the three Angolan
liberation movements—MPLA, Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA)
and Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA)—had its
immediate roots in transitional arrangements constituted a few months prior
to independence. In December 1974, Kaunda facilitated a meeting in Lusaka
attended by MPLA leaders Agostinho Neto, and UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi,
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and the Portuguese High Commissioner, Vice-Admiral Rosa Coutinho to discuss
transitional arrangements. Neto and Savimbi agreed, with OAU support, to jointly
establish, with Holden Roberto’s FNLA, “a common political platform” which
would “serve as a basis for the discussion with the Portuguese government on
the formation of the transitional government”.67 In January 1975, Portugal and
the three liberation movements signed an historic Independence Agreement
in Portugal. The salient feature of the agreement was “Portugal’s recognition
of all the three liberation movements as sole representatives of the Angolan
people” and the “establishment of a Transitional Government composed of the
Portuguese High Commissioner and the three liberation movements”.68 This
was a fragile arrangement essentially because, as Shubi Ishemo (2000) has
shown, the FNLA and UNITA maintained certain ambitions and sought to utilise
their presence in the interim government to prepare to take power. Moreover,
the political situation in Portugal was unstable as the conservative forces of
General Spinola and the “progressive” Armed Forces Movement in the armed
forces contested for state power. Thus, it was not long before the transitional
government collapsed.
The ensuing civil war seriously divided the OAU, reflecting new political
alignments and a global contest for influence by Cold War arch rivals, the United
States and the Soviet Union. At an emergency OAU Summit convened in Addis
Ababa, in January 1976, to deliberate on the Angolan situation, unambiguous
differences emerged between countries supporting MPLA backed by the Soviet
Union and Cuba, on one hand, and those supporting the pro-western alliance of
FNLA and UNITA, on the other. The crucial issue was whether to recognise MPLA
as a legitimate government representing the Angolan people, or to recognise a
government of national unity incorporating all three liberation movements. The
Summit reached a deadlock as out of 46 countries, 22 supported recognition
of MPLA while an equal number of countries expressed preference for a
government of national unity. Two countries remained neutral.69
Former UNIP leaders (Zulu, 2007) and government official accounts have
long propagated the view that the basis for supporting a government of national
unity was to forestall the escalation of the conflict which not only attracted foreign
intervention but also threatened to engulf the entire sub-region into superpower conflict.70 With the benefit of hindsight, Zambia’s attitude on the Angolan
crisis was informed by OAU long-standing policy which urged the membership
to provide support to liberation movements recognised by the continental body.
MPLA, FNLA and UNITA had all been recognised by the OAU. Yet on the challenge
presented by the Angolan crisis, the OAU lamentably failed to produce a unified
stand, allowing individual countries to interpret and define their approach to
the conflict. For Zambia, the position it assumed was politically embarrassing, a
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reflection perhaps of its failure to correctly interpret the situation. Yet it may also
be argued that underlying its attitude strong economic interests were at stake.
The position it adopted was revealing. By supporting an inclusive government
in Angola, Zambia assumed a stance consistent with the position adopted by
South Africa and the United States. The two countries intervened in support of
UNITA and FNLA to counteract what they referred to as “communist threat” in
Angola in view of the fact that both Cuba and the Soviet Union had intervened
and provided massive military support for MPLA. By aligning itself with the prowestern alliance in the conflict, the Zambian government came under severe
criticism from Zambia’s students who accused it of serving western imperialist
interests. In retrospect, it can be argued that Kaunda’s real position on the
Angolan situation was not merely that of advocating a government of national
unity, nor was he neutral. He backed UNITA under the guise of supporting a
government of national unity. A transcribed record of Kaunda’s meeting with
the United States president, Gerald Ford in Washington, in April 1975, suggests
that he desperately backed a “compromise proposal” to ensure Savimbi became
President of Angola after independence in November. In this scheme, Kaunda
solicited American support. He told Gerald Ford that:
We almost ignored Jonas Savimbi ...Our colleagues [in the OAU] had
ignored Savimbi in the past, but this time he emerged as someone who
could save the situation ...The only chance we had of putting someone
forward to the OAU with the possibility of acceptance was to suggest
that Neto and Roberto should each lead his party and Savimbi would
be the compromise leader of all three…Savimbi does not even know of
the compromise proposal for having him as President although it may
have leaked. We have not yet told Savimbi. We must convince him of the
rightness of it…Regardless of the outcome of the elections, Savimbi would
be the President…We look for leadership on the question of Southern
Africa.71
Zambia’s authorities switched their support to Savimbi when they realised
that the MPLA, backed by thousands of Cuban troops and Soviet military
advisers, was about to capture Luanda, the Angolan capital. Kaunda persuaded
the United States to provide military assistance to Savimbi in his fight against
the MPLA. For Kaunda, the US military support for UNITA was essential to
counteract the MPLA and frustrate Soviet designs in Angola (Zukas, 2002, 144).
Kaunda’s intervention in the Angolan crisis had a profound effect in escalating
armed tension in the region. It not only led to intensified involvement of the US
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Angola with massive arms deliveries, but
also led to the American encouragement of the South African invasion of Angola
(Zukas, 2002).
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Because the Zambian government was determined to secure Savimbi’s
leadership of Angola, it also provided military support to UNITA. There is sufficient
evidence that while Zambia’s leaders publicly backed the establishment of a
government of national unity in Angola, they secretly allowed Tiny Rowland’s
Lonrho jet to fly arms to Savimbi via Lusaka Airport. There was also proof that
at the height of the crisis, a Zambia Airways plane laden with ten tons of arms
and ammunition from the Zambia Army had taken off for Huambo, UNITA’s
headquarters in southern Angola (Chisala, 1994). Embarrassingly for Kaunda
and more generally the Zambian government, the pro-western alliance was
defeated by the MPLA. It took a while before Zambia’s authorities recognized
the MPLA government in Angola.

Conclusion
The struggle for black majority rule in southern Africa could not have been
successfully prosecuted without the intervention of international and regional
actors, who extended vital military, material, financial, and diplomatic
assistance to the liberation movements. Yet, as a prominent regional actor, the
role of Zambia in liberation struggles is often underestimated and sometimes
misinterpreted partly because of the apparent contradictions in its policies
towards the liberation movements. The idea of seeking to negotiate with
white minority regimes as the basis of securing change in southern Africa
was intolerable in the eyes of liberation movements and some radical OAU
members who insisted on the primacy of armed struggle. Zambia’s authorities
entertained negotiations mainly for national security reasons. Since Zambia’s
leaders were more concerned with securing the country’s economic interests, I
have argued that they maintained their own approach to resolving the problem
of white minority rule in southern Africa. Their approach was not fixed on
the employment of a single method. It oscillated between fiery revolutionary
rhetoric, plausibly as a response to OAU pressure, and conciliatory offers when
the situation dictated. This approach was consistent with the Lusaka Manifesto.
While affirming their support for armed struggle, they always demonstrated
willingness to secure a negotiated political solution to the problem of white
minority rule in the region. They only supported armed struggle to an extent
that it was a necessary instrument of coercing white minority regimes to the
negotiating table.
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